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Abstract
In this paper we set up a New-Keynesian model that features an interbank market.
The introduction of an interbank market is important to analyze liquidity problems among
heterogenous agents within the ﬁnancial sector. First, because this allows for a situation
where increased liquidity supply by the central bank is only partially passed on to the
interbank market. Second, this framework allows us to analyze one additional policy
measure besides the common interest rate policy undertaken by central banks to alleviate
the liquidity shortage on the interbank market. Namely haircuts on eligible assets in
repurchase agreements (“Repos”). By varying haircuts applied to securities that serve as
collateral in repurchase agreements the stress on the interbank market can be mitigated
by bringing down the interest rate charged among banks. Furthermore an exogenous
bubble process is modeled which enables us to examine the eﬀects of a deviation of the
market price of capital from its fundamental price. This leads to a discussion whether
central banks should ”lean against the wind”, i.e. react to deviations of asset prices in
the setting of their policy instrument. Finally, this paper tries to shed some light on the
“exit strategy” that a central bank should follow after the asset price bubble bursted and
the interbank market begins to work properly again.
JEL codes: E4, E5, E61, G21
keywords: DSGE, Monetary Policy, Collateral, Haircuts, Exit Strategy5
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Non-technical Summary
The way central banks conduct monetary policy changed with the onset of the crisis. Central
banks started not to rely exclusively on traditional interest rate policy but also prolonged the
maturities for repurchase agreements and widened the set of collateral accepted in repurchase
agreement transactions. To enable economists to analyze the macroeconomic consequences
of a central bank resorting to a richer set of monetary policy tools requires to implement
an interbank market in modern macroeconomic models. In recent times a couple of DSGE
models emerged which explicitly incorporate an active banking sector (Gerali et al. (2009),
DeWalque et al. (2009), Dib (2009)).
We set up a New-Keynesian model that features a ﬁnancial sector that consists of two dif-
ferent types of banks, commercial banks and ”investment banks” that buy and sell liquidity
on an interbank market. Commercial banks accept deposits from households and grant loans
to entrepreneurs, i.e. the entrepreneur combines her net worth with a commercial bank loan
to purchase her capital stock employed in production. We introduce a borrowing constraint
in a borrower-lender relationship as in Iacoviello (2005) and more recently in Gerali et al.
(2009). However, in our model the ﬁnancial friction arises in the relationship between the
commercial banks and the ”investment banks” where the commercial bank’s ability to obtain
interbank liquidity is limited by the asset portfolio she can oﬀer as collateral. Another unique
feature of the setup is that the ”investment banks” are the only banks which are able to en-
ter into repurchase agreements with the central bank and hence are the only banks in direct
contact with the central bank. Another feature incorporated in the model is the distinction
between the fundamental price of capital, Q, equivalent to Tobin’s Q and the market price
of capital, S, which considered by the commercial bank sector to assess the collateral value.
In terms of modeling these two variables we relied on the setup introduced by Bernanke
and Gertler (1999). To enhance the monetary policy toolkit we introduce a haircut policy
employed to securities that the central bank accepts as collateral in repurchase agreements
with investment banks.
The results of Dib (2009) show that a ﬁnancial sector helps to dampen monetary policy
shocks to the real economy. This is also true for our model, however, in addition we can show
that if bubbles exist in prices used to value collateral the ﬁnancial sector ampliﬁes shocks
to the real economy. Decreasing haircuts is the instrument we analyzed and it works ﬁne
to boost interbank lending and increase output in total. This comes at the risk of increased
inﬂation in the ﬁrst periods after a negative shock to haircuts. With respect to the ongoing
debate in the literature we back the position of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and claim that6
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asset prices should not be incorporated in the interest rate rule. However, both ﬁnancial and
macroeconomic volatility are lowest if asset price deviations are taken into consideration in
the haircut rule. Finally after the burst of an asset price bubble which results in a recession
a central bank thinking about an exit strategy should always communicate the exit date
and credibly stick to it to ensure a smooth evolution of macroeconomic aggregates. Agents’
expectations formation contributes then to a smoothing of key variables.7
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1 Introduction
What appears to be in substance a direct transfer of mortgage and mortgage-backed securities of questionable
pedigree from an investment bank to the Federal Reserve seems to test the time honored central bank mantra
in time of crisis-”lend freely at high rates against good collateral”-to the point of no return, (Volcker (April 8,
2008), Remarks by Paul Volcker at a Luncheon of the Economic Club of New York)
In the twenty years preceding the current ﬁnancial crisis all major economies have wit-
nessed low macroeconomic volatility. Hence, for central banks it seemed to be suﬃcient to
concentrate on setting its policy instrument to stabilize the interbank rate around its desired
level. However, the way central banks conduct monetary policy changed with the onset of
the crisis. Central banks no longer rely exclusively on traditional interest rate policy but
also prolonged the maturities for Repos and widened the set of collateral accepted in Repo
transactions. The latter is equivalent to a reduction in the haircut applied to speciﬁc types
of assets not accepted before and aims at reviving the interbank market and stabilizing the
economy.
To enable economists to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a central bank resorting
to a richer set of monetary policy tools that are targeted to change the liquidity situation
among banks requires to implement an interbank market in modern macroeconomic models.
In models of Bernanke et al. (1999) or Markovic (2006) banks are ﬁnancial intermediaries
who channel funds between borrowers and lenders and who are assumed to break-even each
period. Only in recent times a couple of DSGE models emerged which explicitly incorporate
an active banking sector (Gerali et al. (2009), DeWalque et al. (2009), Dib (2009)). Our
model features a heterogenous ﬁnancial sector that consists of two diﬀerent types of banks
whose behavior is the outcome of explicit optimization problems and who trade central bank
reserves amongst each other on the interbank market. Although Dib (2009) contains an in-
terbank market it is diﬀerent from the deﬁnition of an interbank market we use. He splits
up the responsibilities of a bank by assuming two separate entities: a savings and a lending
bank. The “interbank market” in Dib (2009) is represented by the commercial bank in our
model setup. A setup similar to Dib (2009) is employed by DeWalque et al. (2009) but here
both banks are assumed to operate in a competitive environment and not in a monopolistic
competitive as in Dib (2009). While Gerali et al. (2009) claim to model an interbank market,
in their model in equilibrium no interaction among wholesale banks takes place. On the other
hand studies that examine interbank liquidity ﬂows are, for example Ewerhart and Tapking
(2008), Allen et al. (2009) and Freixas and Jorge (2008), do not employ a DSGE framework.
Our model also features a borrowing constraint in a borrower-lender relationship as in Ia-
coviello (2005) and more recently in Gerali et al. (2009). However, in our model the ﬁnancial
friction arises in the relationship between the commercial banks and the “investment banks”
where the commercial bank’s ability to obtain interbank liquidity is limited by the asset port-
folio she can oﬀer as collateral.8
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Another unique feature of the model setup employed in this paper is that the “investment
banks” are the only banks which are in direct contact with the central bank to enter into
repurchase agreements. This modeling strategy is based on the observation that usually cen-
tral banks conduct their Repo transactions with only a limited number of participants. In
the case of the Fed there are merely nineteen counterparts (”Primary Dealer”). The ECB in
contrast lists about 2500 banks as eligible counterparties. However, actually only a limited
number of eligible counterparties constantly take part in the main reﬁnancing operations
conducted by the ECB.
In most DSGE models (Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano et al. (2005)) central bank
behavior is represented by an interest rate rule. Only recently several studies deal with
unconventional monetary policy, e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010). These two papers, however, focus on the the extraordinary role of central banks as a
direct lender to enterprises. Our study, however, models a central bank which is not involved
in direct lending to entrepreneurs but rather to banks. We think that this is a much more
realistic assumption when considering the behavior of central banks during the recent ﬁnan-
cial crisis. An extensive study of unconventional monetary policy with a huge emphasis also
on the central bank’s balance sheet has recently been done by Curdia and Woodford (2010).
What separates their paper from ours is the missing interaction of banks on the interbank
sector.
Another feature that distinguishes our study from other studies mentioned above is the dis-
tinction between the fundamental price of capital, Q, equivalent to Tobin’s Q and the market
price of capital, S, which is considered by the commercial bank sector to assess the collateral
value. In terms of modeling these two variables we relied on the setup introduced by Bernanke
and Gertler (1999) who extend the BGG model by distinguishing between the fundamental
and market price of capital. By including an exogenous bubble process we try to contribute
to the ongoing debate in the literature whether central banks should respond to asset prices
as well.
Finally as a second major monetary policy instrument besides the interest rate we introduce
a variable haircut employed to securities that the central bank accepts as collateral in repur-
chase agreements with investment banks. In this context recent papers by Ashcraft et al.
(2010), Adrian and Shin (2009), Curdia and Woodford (2010), and Schabert (2010) needs
to be mentioned. The ﬁrst paper builds on a model with overlapping generations whereas
the second one is not model based but purely empirical. In the work of Schabert (2010) the
central bank lends to households directly and there is no banking sector at all. In addition to
the studies mentioned above there is a working paper by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)
that deals with haircuts.
The results of Dib (2009) show that a ﬁnancial sector helps to dampen monetary policy shocks
to the real economy. This is also true for our model, however, in addition we can show that9
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if bubbles exist in prices used to assess the value of collateral the ﬁnancial sector ampliﬁes
shocks to the real economy. Other major results of this paper are that a lower haircut has
a major, positive impact on the whole economy in the short run. The only drawback is
an increase in inﬂation after the liquidity supply has increased. Furthermore we show that
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) were correct in their conclusion of not including asset prices in
the interest rate rule. The incorporation of asset prices in the haircut rule, however, reduces
immensely the macroeconomic volatility in simulated boom-bust cycles. Finally after the
burst of an asset price bubble which results in a recession a central bank thinking about an
exit strategy should always communicate the exit date and credibly stick to it to ensure a
smooth evolution of macroeconomic aggregates.
This paper is structured in the following way. In Section 2 the model setup is explained. The
calibration to the data is shown in Section 3. We proceed in chapter 4 by stating important
results such as impulse response functions, comparative statics and the exit strategy. Section
5 ﬁnally concludes.
2 Model
The model economy consists of three major blocks: the real sector, the ﬁnancial sector, and
the central bank. The real sector comprises the households and the production sector and
is very similar to Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christensen and Dib (2008). The households
consume a ﬁnal good sold by the retailer and supply labor to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
combine household labor with capital bought from capital good producers to produce an
intermediate good which is sold to retailers. To transfer wealth across periods households
can save by holding deposits with the commercial bank who uses these deposits together with
interbank liquidity obtained from the investment bank to grant loans to entrepreneurs. In
the relationship between the commercial bank and the entrepreneur a demand side friction
is incorporated, which results in an external ﬁnance premium that depends on the net worth
an entrepreneur has accumulated.
The ﬁnancial sector consists of two banks: commercial banks and “investment banks”. By
deﬁnition investment banks do neither lend nor borrow to households. The amount of inter-
bank liquidity a commercial bank can obtain from the investment banks depends on the value
of the collateral the commercial bank can oﬀer. The collateral value depends both on the
size of the collateral pool as well as the market price S. To obtain liquidity from the central
bank, the investment bank has two assets at its disposal: government bonds and ﬁnancial
claims on the asset portfolio of commercial banks. However, the central bank decides which
assets she accepts as collateral in repurchase agreements and at what price and hence about
the liquidity supplied vis-a-vis the investment bank sector. In this section the model setup
and the optimization problems faced by each agent are explained. First order conditions are
completely delegated to the appendix.10
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2.1 Households
Households are inﬁnitely lived and maximize consumption and leisure subject to a budget
constraint. Throughout the model h is attached to variables and parameters to denote an








The inﬁnite sum of discounted utility is maximized by the households under the following





Dt−1(h)+Pt(h) − Tt(h) (2)
Households save in the form of one-period deposits that they cede the commercial banks
at a gross interest rate RD
t . Wt is the wage in real terms that the household gets from
the entrepreneur in exchange for its labor supply. Finally, Pt(h) denotes transfer payments
stemming from proﬁts made by commercial banks, investment banks, the central bank and
retailers. Tt(h) are the lump sum taxes that the government collects from household h.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are perfectly competitive and produce output that is sold to retailers. As
input factors in production they use homogenous labor supplied from households and capital





Technology follows an AR(1) process.
Each period the entrepreneur purchases capital Kt+1 to be used in production in the next
period. The diﬀerence between the value of capital QtKt and her net worth Nt needs to be
ﬁnanced by a loan Bt taken out from the commercial bank.
Bt = QtKt+1 − Nt (4)
The interest rate charged on loans is RB
t . Bernanke et al. (1999) show that an external
ﬁnance premium results from the ﬁnancial contract signed between a bank and the ﬁrm. Dib11
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(2009) implemented this ﬁnancial contract in a model with a banking sector. The expected
external marginal ﬁnance costs are deﬁned as a mark up over the lending rate. The size of
the markup depends on the ratio of the market value of capital over the net worth and is











The external ﬁnance premium given by (StKt+1/Nt)
ψ depends on the entrepreneur’s leverage
ratio. As StKt+1/Nt increases, the borrower increasingly relies on uncollateralized borrowing.
If the parameter ψ is set to zero, the ﬁnancial accelerator vanishes and the mark up is zero.
The size of the elasticity parameter ψ that has originally been calibrated by Bernanke et al.
(1999) to be 0.05 depends on the standard deviation of the distribution of the entrepreneurs
idiosyncratic shocks, agency costs, and the entrepreneurs’ default threshold. The aggregate



















with ν and ω being the survival probability of the entrepreneur and the default probability
of the project the entrepreneur invests in, respectively. μ is the parameter of the supervising
costs of the bank.
Note that the loan contract between the entrepreneur and the commercial bank is conditioned
on the market price of capital St and not on the fundamental price Qt. The distinction
between the market price St and the fundamental price Qt has been proposed by Bernanke
and Gertler (1999) in an extension of the BGG model and allows to model exogenous asset
price bubbles1.
If a unit of capital is valued at the fundamental price Qt optimal demand for capital guarantees



































1for an introduction on asset price bubbles also refer to the seminal paper by Blanchard and Watson (1982)12
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The parameter a determines the speed of convergence back to the fundamental price Qt and
bi sg i v e nb yb ≡ a(1 − δ)2. The shock to the fundamental value ε
SQ
t is normally distributed
with variance σ2
S. In the absence of shocks the market price St moves in line with Qt.
2.3 Capital Producers
Capital producers provide the capital purchased by entrepreneurs. They use a linear tech-





















The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:











where δ determines the depreciation rate and investment is subject to quadratic adjustment
costs with κi denoting the parameter of those costs. This maximization problem is standard
and can be found, e.g. in Dib (2009).
2.4 Retailers
To motivate sticky prices we introduce the Calvo price setting Calvo (1983) as is common
in the New-Keynesian literature. This means that each period a fraction 1 − ξp of retailers
can change their prices. The rest of the retailers index their prices to current inﬂation. As in
Bernanke et al. (1999) monopolistic retailers buy the product of the entrepreneur, transform
it into ﬁnal output at no cost and sell it to households or capital goods producers. The
















where Λ ≡ β Ct
Ct+k denotes the stochastic discount factor of households as those beneﬁt from
the proﬁts of the retailer. Finally Pw
t ≡ Pt
Xt is the nominal price of wholesale goods, with Xt
as the gross markup.
2in the case of rational bubbles Blanchard and Watson (1982) this value would be one.13
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2.5 Commercial Bank
The commercial bank maximizes over both the interest RD
t and RB
t and takes the interest
rate on the interbank market RIB
t as given. The commercial bank’s liability side comprises
deposits Dt(j) and interbank funds IBt(j) obtained from households and investment banks,
respectively. These funds are invested by providing loans Bt(j) to entrepreneurs which con-
stitute the asset side of the commercial bank’s balance sheet.
Table 1: Balance sheet of commercial bank j
Assets Liabilities
Loans to Entr. Bt(j) Deposits Dt(j)
Interbank Loans IBt(j)










































with κb and κd being the adjustment cost parameter for both interest rates. As deposits and
loans of diﬀerent commercial banks are imperfect substitutes for households, the maximiza-


















The pledge of the entrepreneurs contains the fundamental value of capital. However, as soon
as the collateral is pledged to the commercial bank, in an act of securitization, the commercial
banks take the market price of capital St into account and not the fundamental price Qt.I n
return for the loan the commercial bank obtains collateral worth QtKt. However the loan
granted is only QtKt − Nt. So we assumed that the commercial bank can only partially
securitize its loan portfolio. So both components StKt and Nt are weighted by the parameter
o. This assumption is necessary because otherwise part of the ﬁnancial market would be
decoupled from the rest of the economy and would no longer need real activity to survive on
its own3. Asset-backed securities are then deﬁned as
ABSCoB
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The commercial bank is also subject to a borrowing constraint vis-a-vis the investment bank,
i.e. in order to obtain interbank liquidity the commercial bank pledges its asset backed
securities as collateral. This constraint takes the following form:
RIB
t IBt ≤ mtABSCoB
t (15)
where mt is the loan-to-value ratio that is set to 0.75 in steady state and responds to deviations
of the market price of capital from the fundamental price, ut, to incorporate the reluctance
of “investment banks” to provide interbank loans in the presence of asset price bubbles. In
log-linearized terms mt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process4:
mt = ρmmt−1 − 2 · ut +  m
t (16)
We assume that the borrowing constraint is satisﬁed with equality. Gerali et al. (2009) use
also a similar borrowing constraint and refer to Iacoviello (2005) when assuming that it is
always binding if the size of the shock is suﬃciently small such that the economy remains in
the neighborhood of the steady-state.
Finally the balance sheet identity has to hold in all periods t.
Bt(j)=Dt(j)+IBt(j) (17)
2.6 Investment Banks
The investment bank5 in our set acts as a friction on the interbank market and behaves as
an agent on its own. The motivation for the modeling of a hierarchical interbank market is
twofold. First due to the structure found in the US where only Primary Dealers are able
to deal with the central bank whereas a vast group of commercial banks is not allowed to
directly deal with the monetary authority. Second, while in Europe in theory about 2500
banks are allowed to participate in the bidding process in main reﬁnancing operations of the
ECB only about 12% 6 participate regularly. The other banks rely on interbank funding.
3Christiano et al. (2007) assume similarly that entrepreneurial net worth is not accumulated over time but
consumed every period by consumers and entrepreneurs every period so that loans are still needed and that
capital cannot only be acquired by net worth
4In section 4.4 we assume that the loan-to-value ratio is controlled by a supervisory authority and therefore
the deviation of the market price from its fundamental value has to be included
5The investment bank in our model should not be confused with the common notion of an investment
bank and its responsibilities in the real world
6Gray and Stella (2008)15
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Therefore we see this modeling strategy as a feasible way to represent the structure found
in reality. Unlike the commercial bank, the “investment bank” does not maximize over an
interest rate but with respect to interbank lending and excess reserves. The interest rate
on the interbank market Rib
t is the outcome of the proﬁt-maximizing behavior of both the
commercial bank and the “investment bank”. She takes the policy rate Rt set by the central
bank as given. The liabilities of the individual investment bank consist of the central bank
liquidity obtained via OMOs. The assets are composed of loans to commercial banks and
excess reserves.
Each investment bank maximizes its proﬁt function which has the following form.
Table 2: Balance sheet of the Investment Bank
Assets Liabilities









t (k) − Xt(k)
 




which is mathematically the same as RIB
t IBt(k) − Rt(MD
t (k) − Xt(k)) but emphasizes that
the investment bank not only cares about the absolute interbank rate but also about the




t − Rt (19)
We assume that investment bank’s demand for central bank liquidity depends on the opti-
mally chosen value for interbank lending and excess reserves as follows8:
Mt(k)=IBt(k)ζXt(k)1−ζ (20)
Unlike the Cobb-Douglas production function that takes labor and capital as input factors
and yields goods as output, this one takes the other route and uses money M as sole input
factor and delivers interbank funds and excess reserves output in its maximization calculus.
The investment bank also faces a constraint when taking out a Repo loan from the central
bank.
MD
t (k)=Gt(k)+( 1− ht)ABSPD
t (k) (21)
The liquidity obtainable by each individual investment bank is denoted by MD
t (k). The right
hand side shows the two types of collateral accepted by the central bank: government bonds
Gt and asset-backed securities ABSt(k). However, if the latter can be used as collateral in
Repo transactions depends on the decision of the central bank. If ht = 1 the central bank
7Compare also Graph 2 with the interbank rate ﬂuctuating around the policy rate
8Excess reserves can be interpreted as a riskless investment opportunity for the investment bank16
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does not accept ABS as collateral in Repo transactions. This would be the case of the Fed
before the crisis. In Europe the haircut was lower than one even before the crisis and were
lowered even more during the crisis. The lower it gets, the higher the volume of ABS accepted
or put diﬀerently, it applies a lower discount to risky securities. Government bonds are set
such that the liquidity demand equation (21) is satisﬁed.
2.7 Central Bank
The balance sheet of the central bank in the economy is highly stylized. On the liability
side there is money in circulation MCB
t that the central bank gives to the investment banks
and an equity term ECB
t . Equity results from the fact that the central bank is able to
choose a haircut on ABS in Repo transactions. On the asset side the central bank has both
government bonds (and ABS) that are eligible assets in open market operations. By adjusting
Table 3: Balance sheet of the Central Bank
Assets Liabilities
Government Bonds Gt Money in circulation MCB
t
(Asset-backed securities ABSCB
t ) Equity ECB
t
the haircut at which it purchases the collateral it can vary the amount of liquidity that it
grants the investment bank. The haircut ht ﬁxed by the central bank is speciﬁed by the
following process
ht = ρhht−1 + cSt − εh
t (22)
In general the money stock in the economy is rising, the smaller the haircut. That is,
the trade-oﬀ the central bank faces when maximizing interbank activity/reducing interbank
turmoil comes at the cost of building up inﬂationary pressures. In order to analyze the
liquidity policy of the central bank and the exit strategy after a severe recession this process
also features a shock term εh
t . The shock is assumed to be normally distributed with variance
σ2
h.
Besides steering the liquidity situation on the interbank market, the central bank also has a
broader macroeconomic view and responsibility. As usual this is implemented by an interest
rate rule. If contemporaneous inﬂation is above its target the central bank reacts by increasing
the short rate. In addition it also reacts to deviations of output from its long run trend.
Rt = ρrRt−1 + φπ(πt+1 − ¯ π)+φy(Y − ¯ Y )+ R
t (23)
We do not postulate that the haircut rule and the interest rate rule are both equally important
and can stimulate economic activity in the same way. Predominant is still the interest rate
rule with its connection to the real economy and thereby securing the households’ well being.17
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The haircut rule, however, is suited to ﬁne-tune the liquidity situation on the interbank
market once the interest rule policy does not have the desired eﬀect anymore because of
the zero lower bound. We can show that a decrease in the haircut can stimulate both the











The objective function corresponds to the proﬁt that the central bank makes with seigniorage
minus the payment on excess reserves the investment bank holds in its account with the central
bank. Also the proﬁts of the central bank go the household.
2.8 Aggregate conditions
Finally, the following aggregate conditions have to hold. Borrowings of entrepreneurs and
lendings by commercial banks need to coincide.
Bt = γCoBBt(j) (25)
The same holds true for the savings of households and deposits accepted by the commercial
banks
γCoBDt(j)=γPDt(p) (26)
Total interbank lending has to satisfy
γCoBIBt(i)=γPDIBt(k) (27)





The collateral markets for asset-backed securities (ABS) between commercial banks and in-










The goods market clearing ﬁnally requires
Yt + Gt = Ct + Qt
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3 Calibration
One crucial task of calibrating this model is to deal with a real sector where one period
usually corresponds to one quarter as macroeconomic aggregates like GDP are updated on
a quarterly basis. In contrast, information about ﬁnancial variables are updated in a much
higher frequency. The compromise that we ﬁnd here is to calibrate the model to monthly
data9. So most of the parameters on which the literature agreed on and that are calibrated to
quarterly data are adjusted to a monthly frequency. Hence, the discount rate of households β
is set to 0.997 which implies a yearly interest rate of 3.6%, which is in line with other studies
which assume 4% per year. For the instantaneous household utility we assume log preferences
for both consumption and labor. The fraction of capital employed in the production process
α is not time-variant either and is set to 0.33 a value commonly found in the literature. With
respect to the rate of depreciation that is commonly calibrated to be 10% a year, we set the
monthly depreciation rate to be 0.008. The coeﬃcient determining the mark-up  p is time-
invariant and set to 6 as e.g. in Bernanke et al. (1999). However, the fraction of retailers
being able to set prices each period is set slightly higher than in the monthly speciﬁcation.
Normally it is assumed (as in Bernanke et al. (1999)) that (1 − ξp) is equal to 0.25. In our
context we set this value to 0.15 to account for the monthly frequency. Both the elasticities
of the demand functions for entrepreneurial loans and household deposits and the adjustment
cost parameters for both interest rates are taken from Gerali et al. (2009) and taken by three
as their calibration is quarterly. So, the values are 852 and 759 for the deposit and loan
demand elasticities, respectively, and 540 and 1125 for the adjustment cost parameter κd and
κb, respectively.
The ﬁnancial friction parameter ψ which is calibrated by Bernanke et al. (1999) to be 0.05
is recalibrated with our parameters from above and equals 0.0506. Two parameters are
important for the development of the bubble process, a and b. Those are exactly set as in
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), to 0.98 and 0.97216 (which equals a(1 − δ)). The amount of
entrepreneurial labor is chosen to be 0.01 as is common in the literature, see Bernanke et al.
(1999). The elasticity of Tobin’s q with respect to investment is set to 0.5 as in Bernanke and
Gertler (2001). The leverage of the entrepreneurs is assumed to be 2. Finally the survival
rate of entrepreneurs is set to 0.95 in line with Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
The values in the interest rate rule are set in accordance with Taylor (1993). With respect to
the autoregressive parameters in the AR(1) processes we increased all values in comparison
to existing studies as those were chosen to match quarterly time series dynamics. So in our
study all of them range in the zone from 0.95 in the case of government expenditure to 0.99
in the case of the central bank tools, haircut and interest rate.
The one parameter that is completely unknown in the literature is the intensity of interbank
loans or excess reserves in the production function of the investment banks. We set it to 0.9
9This approach is also often used in the macro-ﬁnance literature, see for example Borgy et al. (2011)19
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which seems reasonable and in line with most of the banks’ balance sheets. In addition the
robustness checks indicate that the results are robust to higher values for this parameter.
The haircut is set in steady state to be 0.2, as the ECB paid a little more than 80 percent
for BBB ranked assets.
A comprehensive summary of all parameter and imposed steady state values can be found in
the appendix.
4 Results
In this section we discuss the results of the model. In section 4.1 impulse responses to the most
relevant shocks are discussed. Furthermore we examine whether diﬀerent kinds of shocks are
ampliﬁed or dampened in the presence of an interbank market to emphasize the importance
of the interbank market for the behavior of the model economy. In the case without interbank
market we neglect the investment bank and have therefore no interbank lending, no excess
reserves and the interbank rate is set to be identical to the policy rate. The commercial bank
is in this case in direct contact with the central bank10. In this context we are not examining
the reaction of the variables (see subsection before) but just the magnitude of the deviation
from steady state of these two diﬀerent model setups. Secondly, sections 4.2 answers the
question whether in our model framework central banks should ”lean against the wind”,
i.e. react to asset prices or not. Boom-bust cycles caused by market price ﬂuctuations are
simulated following the procedure laid out in Bernanke and Gertler (1999). Finally, in section
4.3 three diﬀerent exit strategies for the central bank are analyzed. The impulse responses
are expressed in percentage deviations from steady state and one period corresponds to one
month. All corresponding ﬁgures can be found in the appendix.
4.1 Impulse Responses to shocks
In this section we examine the model dynamics to four types of shocks: a monetary policy
shock, a shock to the haircut applied to risky assets, a shock to technology and to the market
price of capital.
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions to an unanticipated 25 bp increase (3% in
annualized terms) in the nominal interest rate. As the policy rate rises, liquidity demanded
by the investment banks declines and the interest rate for interbank loans increases. This
in turn lets the commercial banks demand less interbank funds. At the same time a higher
interest rate induces the investment bank to hold more excess reserves at the central bank.
10Even in the model without an interbank market the results will diﬀer from Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
due to the presence of an proﬁt maximizing commercial bank20
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This countercyclical movement of interbank loans and excess reserves is due to the speciﬁca-
tion of the production function of the investment bank11. The fundamental price of capital
Qt decreases on impact and returns gradually to its steady state. The response of output and
inﬂation is in line with many other New-Keynesian studies. Hence, our model recommends
to raise interest rates in response to a boom in asset prices. This is exactly what should have
happened in the US where the policy rate has been kept at a too low level for too long.
An interbank market smoothes the responses of the economy to a monetary policy shock com-
pared to the case without an interbank market. Taking, e.g. output and inﬂation, the impulse
responses are all qualitatively the same but the initial impact is much more pronounced. Liq-
uidity decreases more than in the case where an interbank market is not present. Finally
also the decline in the fundamental price of capital and therefore also in the value of ABS is
stronger if the interbank market is shut down.
If the central bank lowers the haircut on ABS (as is the case in Figure 2), liquidity supply
increases on impact and converges slowly back to its steady-state. This is due to the fact that
the autoregressive parameter of the haircut is chosen to be very close to one and secondly
as mentioned above one time period corresponds to one month12. As expected both output
and inﬂation increase on impact in response to a 10% decrease in the haircut applied by the
central bank. The lowering of the haircut has a positive eﬀect on the fundamental price of
capital which then increases the value of the ABS. As the total value of collateral oﬀered
by the commercial banks in return for interbank loans increases, the interbank lending rate
decreases which stimulates interbank lending. Besides rising interbank lending also excess
reserves go up. This is the only time that both quantities move in the same direction 13.I n
addition output rises on impact. This stimulus, however, comes at a cost of higher inﬂation.
A comparison between the model with and without an interbank market is not very mean-
ingful here as the haircut policy in our setup only works with an interbank market. The
assumption hinges on the fact that the investment bank gets liquidity from the central bank
in exchange for government bonds and asset-backed securities. Once the interbank market is
eliminated, the haircut policy is nil because commercial banks enter in direct relation with
the central bank to obtain their funding. So the stimulus by a negative haircut shock only
functions with an interbank market and more precisely only with the hierarchical structure
that we setup.
In Figure 3 technology increases by 1%. As this shock originates in the real sector the
responses of the real variables (output, inﬂation, fundamental price of capital) are in line
with other studies that incorporate a ﬁnancial accelerator, e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999) and
Christensen and Dib (2008). As the technology shock leads to a decrease in the policy rate,
11The percentage increase in excess reserves is much higher because its steady state value is very low.
12In a period of forty quarters liquidity as well as the other persistent ﬁnancial variables converge back to
their steady states
13Compare on the real side the increase of both labor and capital after a technology shock using the same
production function speciﬁcation.21
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the interbank lending rate decreases as well which in turn leads to higher interbank lending
activity.
In the case of a technology shock the two setups deliver similar responses for output and con-
sumption. If the interbank market is missing the price of capital and therefore the ABS are
deviating a bit more from their respective steady states. The same holds true for liquidity. If
anything, then a shock to technology is dampened by the presence of the interbank market,
although not by as much as in the case of a monetary policy shock.
Finally we analyze a shock which leads to a 10% increase in the market price St
14. In this
case, for the ﬁrst time, the impulse responses of market price and fundamental price are
not identical (see Figure 4). While both prices increase, the market value rises ten times
as much, driving up the value of the asset-backed securities above their fundamental value
as their value depend on the market price St. Although the liquidity supply by the central
bank rises with the value of the asset backed securities banks are reluctant to increase their
interbank lending and rather invest in riskless excess reserves. Hence, in our model banks
become more cautious in their investment behavior in response to sharp increases in asset
prices.
Although the increase in the value of the asset-backed securities results from a shock to the
market price and not from an increase in the liquidity supplied by the central bank, the model
resembles the behavior of the banks in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis. Namely, that in
response to an increase in liquidity banks are reluctant to lend in the interbank market and
rather invest in riskfree assets.
A shock to the market price St exhibits a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent evolution of variables. With-
out an interbank market the size of the market price increase is only about a third compared
to its impact in the setup that features an interbank market. ABS and liquidity show similar
responses across the model speciﬁcations. Having only a minuscule but negative eﬀect on
the interest rates the real sector develops a life on its own and behaves counterintuitive if no
interbank market is considered. The fundamental value goes down as investment decreases
after a slight interest rate decrease. Output and consumption react in the same way. Inﬂation
is increasing but only by very little. After all and despite some counterintuitive results the
volatility is nevertheless greatly reduced once the interbank market is eliminated. In this case
the interbank market acts as an amplifying mechanism.
4.2 Monetary policy in times of Boom-Bust cycles
This subsection applies the same methodology as Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Bernanke
and Gertler (2001) enriched by a microfounded interbank market and an additional central
bank instrument. The question we try to answer is whether central banks should ”lean
14The deviation of the fundamental value Qt from the market price St is denoted by ut22
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against the wind”, i.e. if a central bank should respond to deviations of asset prices from
their fundamental value. We plot six variables15: Output and inﬂation to analyze the impact
on macrovolatility, interest rate spread and excess reserves to consider ﬁnancial markets and
the fundamental and the market price of capital. In all ﬁgures in this subsection we compare
four diﬀerent cases that are also speciﬁed in the appendix. These cases diﬀer in their role of
output and asset price deviations for the setting of the policy instruments.
Figure 5 resembles the analysis of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler
(2001) within our model setup and compares accomodative and aggressive monetary policy
either without (cases1&2 )o rwith (cases 5 & 6) the central bank reacting to deviations of
asset prices. In this case the haircut rule is a simple AR(1) process that does not react to as-
set prices. The results for cases 1 and 2 resemble the results in Bernanke and Gertler (1999),
namely, that a higher response coeﬃcient on inﬂation dampens both output and inﬂation.
As can be seen cases 5 and 6 are very similar throughout and deliver more macrostability
but are less smooth in the ﬁnancial variables compared to the cases 1 and 2. This is opposed
to the position of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) who claim that the interest rate should not
respond to asset price deviations. As expected the prices for capital are less diverging from
the steady state once the interest rate rule incorporates a response to asset price deviations.
In Figure 6 we come to the core of the debate between Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and
Cecchetti et al. (2002). The latter argue that once the interest rate rule contains also a
response to output the argumentation of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) no longer holds. This
means that case 7 where the central bank reacts to deviations of output and asset prices
should be more stable in terms of macroeconomic volatility than case 3 where the central
bank does not respond to asset prices. We can conﬁrm the result of Cecchetti et al. (2002)
for inﬂation and partly for output as well as for the price of capital. On the ﬁnancial side,
however, cases 3 and 7 give similar results with case 3 exhibiting a little less volatility. The
overall performance can be dramatically improved however if the haircut rule is allowed to
respond to asset prices either without (case 9) or with (case 11) the interest rate exhibiting
”leaning again the wind” behavior. So macrostability in this setup is primarily achieved by
the liquidity management of the haircut rule and not by the interest rate policy.
4.3 Exit strategies
In the aftermath of a crisis exit strategies and primarily the timing of the exit are very
important questions for central banks. We are not able to analyze the optimal exit date
within our model. Nevertheless we are able to analyze the response of the economy to
15Bernanke and Gertler (1999) also plot only six variables: output, inﬂation, the market price of capital,
the fundamental price of capital, the return on capital and the external ﬁnance premium23
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an exit. Methodologically we follow Angeloni et al. (2010) who examine exit strategies at
the government level in a deterministic environment. However, we perform this exercise in
connection with exit strategies of the monetary authority. In our scenario we examine three
cases: (1) the exit from a haircut policy by which risky assets are purchased at lower haircuts
than usual (2) the simultaneous exit from both the above mentioned haircut policy and an
interest rate policy that keeps the interest rate close to its zero lower bound (3) an exit from a
policy that keeps the loan-to-value ratio at unusual high values16. Note that both the haircut
rule and the loan-to-value ratio respond to asset price deviations.
In Figure 7 we depict six variables and their reactions if the market price is shocked negatively.
One path shows how the economy evolves if the central bank can credibly commit not to exit
from its haircut policy (“no exit”). Given a negative shock to the market price the haircut
rule decreases constantly keeping output stable and inﬂation and the prices of capital close
to their steady state values. Another path exempliﬁes how the variables evolve if agents are
surprised by the fact that the central bank ignores deviations of the market price of capital
from period twenty-ﬁve onwards (“unanticipated exit”) and the haircut returns back to its
steady-state value at a pace governed by the AR-coeﬃcient. It is obvious that until this
period the economy’s response is identical to the “no exit”-case. Afterwards, given that the
haircut is no longer responding to the asset price output and inﬂation drop immediately and
considerably, as liquidity is reduced sharply. Also the prices of capital reduce unexpectedly
before returning gradually to the steady state value. The last path depicted in Figure 12
belongs to a situation where the agents anticipate correctly from the very beginning that after
24 periods the central bank is no longer stimulating the economy with its haircut instrument
(“anticipated exit”). Hence for all variables this path has to diﬀer from period 1 on as the
expectation of the central bank abandoning the liquidity provision drives up output after a
few periods and letting inﬂation fall from the start. Once the haircut rule is actually shut
down, also the prices of capital and output experience a sudden but only slight dip before
returning fast to their steady states. Only inﬂation takes longer to adjust. In a nutshell, if
the central bank succeeds in convincingly communicating their exit strategy to the agents,
the economy experiences lower volatility.
Figure 8 shows the analysis when the central bank exits its haircut policy after 24 periods and
simultaneously increases the interest rate to a level implied by the Taylor-rule. The results
are more mixed in this example. For output and inﬂation the anticipated response is much
closer to the unanticipated one. Unlike in the previous case where only an exit to the haircut
rule was examined the response to inﬂation looks much smoother with an initial spike in the
beginning as the interest rate is ﬁxed close to its zero lower bound. Output and also the price
of capital experience more pronounced downturns if the policy rate is held simultaneously at
zero. The bottom line for the central bank is that less volatility in inﬂation comes at the cost
of more volatility in the other variables.
16One could assume that the loan-to-value is controlled by a supervisory authority whose only objective is
to keep excesses on the interbank market at bay.24
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Finally, in Figure 9 we assume that the central bank is able to control the loan-to-value ratio
and acts as a supervisory authority. The setup is the same as in the previous cases with the
instrument being shut down after 24 periods and letting it return to its steady-state value
at a speed governed by a pure AR(1) afterwards. In the “no exit”-case the loan-to-value
ratio would be constantly above the steady state value leading to very little macroeconomic
volatility as can be seen in Figure 9. After a shock to the market price output decreases and
inﬂation increases slightly. In the case of an anticipated exit, the reaction of output and and
inﬂation is stronger. After the exit output as well as the prices for capital increase sharply
whereas inﬂation drops considerably because we assumed that the loan-to-value ratio runs
countercyclical to the ABS. Once the loan-to-value ratio returns to its normal level, the ABS
increase and overall demand in the real sector drives up the price of capital and output. If the
exit is unanticipated by the agents output and the price of capital increase even stronger.
5 Conclusion
The ﬁnancial crisis has changed the way economists have to think about modeling and ex-
plaining monetary policy. This paper tries to take a step in the right direction by modeling
an interbank sector that is motivated from individual optimizing behavior of banks in the
presence of an interbank market. By this modeling device unconventional monetary policy
can be analyzed which includes not only a simple interest rate rule but also collateral policy.
Thereby not only central bank behavior in the crisis but also an exit strategy that all central
banks in the world are looking for after a recession can be examined. Furthermore we are
able to take up the debate of Bernanke and Gertler against primarily Cecchetti and argue
whether it is advisable to include asset prices in the interest rate rule and enhance it by
equally analyzing a second monetary instrument.
We ﬁnd that the interbank market matters for the economy as a whole as it decreases macroe-
conomic volatility if an interest rate shock hits the economy and ampliﬁes it if an asset price
bubble occurs. Once this market is drying up or risks to be malfunctioning due to a ﬁnancial
crisis, central banks have to react and stimulate the liquidity situation on this market by
other measures than ordinary interest rate setting. Decreasing haircuts is the instrument
we analyzed and it works ﬁne to boost interbank lending and increase output in total. This
comes at the risk of increased inﬂation in the ﬁrst periods after a negative shock to haircuts.
With respect to the ongoing debate in the literature we back the position of Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) and claim that asset prices should not be incorporated in the interest rate rule.
However, both ﬁnancial and macroeconomic volatility are lowest if asset price deviations are
taken into consideration in the haircut rule. After a negative shock to the market prices of
ﬁnancial assets banks could reduce further macroeconomic volatility if they announce an exit
date and stick to it. Agents’ expectations formation contributes then to a smoothing of key
variables.25
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An interesting way to extend the model would be ﬁrst to implement default probabilities
on the interbank market which certainly would increase the responses in a ﬁnancial crisis
setup. Secondly, having already some type of shocks included both in the real as well as in
the ﬁnancial sector, one further possibility would be to estimate the model to match certain
country characteristics more accurately.26
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A Appendix
A.1 Graphics for Illustration




















Working Paper Series No 1373
August 2011
Graph 2: Behavior of the ECB interest rates and overnight interest rate
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A.2.5 Commercial Bank
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A.4 Calibrated Parameters
Table 4: Parameter values in the model
Parameters Values Parameters Values
β 0.997  d 852
α 0.33  b 759
δ 0.008  y 6
κd 540 ψ 0.0506
κb 1125 ν 0.95
ξp 0.85 a 0.98
om 0.01   0.5
ζ 0.9 ϑ 0.9792
γp 1 ρg 0.9
γi 1 ρm 0.9
γCoB 1 ρr 0.99
γpd 1 ρa 0.95
γl 1 ρh 0.98
γh 1 ρπ 1.5
τ 0.15 ρy 0.5
b = a · (1 − δ) 0.9722 c 0
Ass 1 d 0
πss 1 Ω 0.01







Table 5: Parameter values in the various Boom-Bust cycle cases
Cases Values Cases Values
ρπ ρy c d ρπ ρy c d
Case 1 1.01 0 0 0 Case 5 1.01 0.5 0 0
Case 2 2 0 0 0 Case 6 1.01 0.5 0 0.1
Case 3 1.01 0 0 0.1 Case 7 1.01 0.5 0.5 0
Case 4 2 0 0 0.1 Case 8 1.01 0.5 0.5 0.135
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A.5 Dynamic Analysis
A.5.1 Impulse Responses to Main Shocks and the importance of the interbank
market
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A.5.2 Boom-bust cycles
Figure 5: Redoing the Bernanke and Gertler (1999) exercise with an interbank market
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Figure 6: Extending Bernanke and Gertler (1999) to “lean against the wind” using the
haircut
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A.5.3 Exit strategies
Figure 7: Unanticipated exit from a constant lower haircut:
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Figure 8: Unanticipated exit from a constant lower haircut plus return to Taylor-rule:
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Figure 9: Unanticipated exit from a constant higher loan-to-value ratio:
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